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Skepticism Concerning Human Agency
Sciences of the Self Versus "Voluntariness" in the La w

PAUL SHELDON DAVIES

T

he findings of neuroscience cast grave doubts on the view of human agency
implicit in the law. They do this by forcing us toward a form of skepticism
concerning our capacities as agents. That is the thesis of this chapter.
The findings of neuroscience do not cast doubt in isolation. They do so
when combined with findings in cognitive and social psychology and find
ings in evolutionary theory and primate cognition, and when integrated into a
large-canvas view that sometimes results from informed philosophical reflec
tion. This is a powerful methodological directive demonstrated throughout
On the Origin of Species, a directive that ought to be adopted in the study of the
self as much as in the study of life.
The logic of Darwin's (1859) argument is a sequence of abductive arguments
concerning a broad range of distinct biological, geological, and geographi
cal phenomena. None of his arguments is decisive taken alone, and some are
stronger than others, but their combined power comes from a weighty con
vergence upon a single, unifying view of life, drawn from an accumulation
of inferences to the best explanation concerning several distinct phenomena.
This strategy, so potent in the study of life, is our best bet in the study of capac
ities that animate living things. Questions about human agency, for instance,
including the viability of concepts of legal responsibility, cannot be settled
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with a small set of experiments or a localized hypothesis. What we need is a
large-canvas view that integrates knowledge trom the relevant sciences. And
once we formulate such a view, we find that at present we do not know what
kind of agent we are. An informed skepticism best describes where we are
today.
Ihe shape of my argument is as follows. Section 1 introduces the main
target of my discussion: a concept of voluntariness that appears essential
to a concept of criminal responsibility. I focus on "voluntariness" for the
sake of concreteness. Once we appreciate the converging doubts against
this concept, doubts concerning other concepts of agency naturally arise.
Section II is a brief summary of my very general grounds for thinking that
the methods with which we study the human self are in need of reform. The
following two sections offer a more specific defense of this call for reform,
as well as a few preliminary reformative steps, what I call directives for
inquiry. 1 propose one directive in section III that is ameliorative or cura
tive in nature and three additional directives in section IV that are explora
tory rather than curative. Then, in section V, on the basis of my proposed
directives, I defend my skepticism regarding human agency. I conclude by
drawing out the implications of this skepticism for the specified notion of
criminal responsibility.

"VOLUNTARINESS" AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
For the sake of concreteness, I focus on the partial characterization of criminal
guilt from section 2.01 of the Model Penal Code, which states that an agent is
criminally guilty for a given action only if it was voluntary, where "voluntary
action" is characterized in conditions (a) to (d):
A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct
that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which
he is physically capable. The following are not voluntary acts within the
meaning of this Section: (a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a bodily movement
during unconsciousness or sleep; (c) conduct during hypnosis or result
ing from hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily movement that otherwise is
not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious
or habitual.
The core assertion is simple, at least on the surface: the attribution of guilt
for an action is justified only if the agent's conduct was a bodily movement
produced by "the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual." 1
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It may appear, however, that a person can be guilty in a quite different way,
by failing to perform some action despite being physically capable. An agent
may be guilty not by virtue of actions that result from effort or determination
but simply by virtue of omissions, in which case this section of the Model Penal
Code may be interpreted as articulating two distinct concepts of legal respon
sibility, only one of which employs "voluntariness." Although I am skeptical of
any such "two concepts" interpretation, I shall, for the sake of this discussion,
restrict my argument to acts of commission and silently pass over the question
of whether criminal acts of omission rest upon a prior "voluntary" act that the
agent performed or reasonably should have performed.2 After all, if the single
notion of legal responsibility applied to acts of commission falls to my skepti
cism, that is enough to show that the concept "voluntariness" in the Code is
deeply problematic.
Note, then, that the characterization of "voluntariness" in (a) to (d) is
remarkably uninformative. The first three conditions are entirely negative:
bodily movements not "determined" by the agent—reflexive movements,
sleepwalking, for example—are not voluntary. What, then, are the dis
tinguishing properties of movements that are voluntary? We are not told.
Condition (d) merely generalizes from the negative characterization in (a)
to (c): only movements produced by the effort or determination of the actor
are voluntary.
That this section of the Code is nonspecific is not an automatic indictment,
however. Laws are tools designed to fulfill certain functions, and some func
tions can be executed with relatively blunt instruments, his, I surmise, is
true of the above characterization of voluntariness. The relevant conditions
are sparsely specified on the assumption that there is enough shared cultural
knowledge concerning the causes of human conduct to fill the gaps. The lack
of specificity in the law is tolerable, perhaps preferable, because our shared
cultural knowledge enables us—lawyers, judges, and jurors—to apply the law
in light of the particulars of each case. This may provide a degree of flexibility
that a fuller specification of "voluntariness" may rule out.
If the above characterization of voluntary action is deliberately generic in
this way, then the crucial assumption must be something like this: most adult
citizens (including those likely to serve as jurors) know that we are agents
who sometimes "determine" their actions and also know when, under what
conditions, our actions are in fact the results of our "determinations." If this
crucial assumption is false, then the law cannot fulfill its function. If there
is not shared knowledge in areas where the law has jurisdiction—if lawyers,
judges, and jurors do not know enough to reliably discern actions genuinely
determined by the actor from those determined by other factors—then the law
is defective.
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The question, then, is whether this crucial assumption is true. Do most
aduli citizens know that we are agents who sometimes determine their
actions? Do most know when, under what conditions, our actions result
from such determinations? The question is not whether most citizens believe
that they have such knowledge, but whether they in fact have it. To answer
this question, we have no recourse but to turn to our best developed scien
tific theories of the self and, on the model of Darwin in the Origin, paint in
vivid colors our most informed large-canvas view of our capacities as agents.
Once we do that, we will see that the answer to this question, in light of cur
rent knowledge, is a decidedly negative one; the concept of voluntariness in
the above notion of legal responsibility is at odds with what we know about
ourselves.

THE AIMS AND STRATEGIES OF CONTEMPORARY
THEORIES OF THE SELF
I turn to the general aims and strategies of contemporary theories of the self.
I do not claim that these aims and strategies are explicitly endorsed by con
temporary theorists in philosophy, psychology, or legal studies. I claim only
that they accurately reflect the overarching commitments and methods of
many theorists in those areas. As we will see, these aims and strategies tend
to diminish rather than enhance our chances of discovering the truth about
ourselves. The methods with which we study ourselves are in need of reform. '
At a high level of abstraction, the methods with which we study ourselves
are either conceptually conservative or conceptually imperialistic. Neither con
servatism nor imperialism by itself is objectionable but, when applied to dubi
ous concepts, both methods retard our efforts at discovering the truth. The call
for reform, in consequence, is a call for directives that cure us of conservatism
and imperialism, as well as directives that guide us in our efforts to discover
the truth.
Conceptual conservatism is a strategic orientation toward inquiry, affect
ing the way we frame our questions and answers. The overarching goal is to
conserve or save as far as possible concepts of apparent importance, concepts
that appear salient in our more general worldview. The preferred strategy for
saving apparently important concepts is to "locate" them amid the concepts
and claims of some preferred base theory. For naturalists, the preferred base
is usually a well-developed scientific theory; for non-naturalists, it is some
well-entrenched part of our inherited worldview. Ruse (2003) presents a
book-length exercise in conceptual conservatism, aspiring to save a concept
of normative functions in evolutionary biology even at the cost of resuscitat
ing Kant's (1790) theory of natural purposes.
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Conceptual imperialism is more ambitious than conservatism. The over
arching goal is not to save apparently important concepts as far as possible but
to force the rest of our conceptual scheme to accommodate certain concepts
at any cost. Certain concepts, it is assumed, have dominion over other con
cepts and over methods of inquiry. These, according to the imperialist, are
concepts without which we would be unable coherently to think or articulate
a view of the relevant phenomena. Chishoim (1964) was an imperialist regard
ing the human self—he insisted that the libertarian concept of free will had to
be retained even at the cost of accepting that every conscious, rational person
is a little Thomistic god.
Conservatism and imperialism may be appropriate in some contexts but
not when applied to dubious concepts. A concept is dubious when there are
justified grounds for excluding it from our theorizing. Such concepts fall into
two general groups. Some are dubious by descent. These are categories that
descend to us from a worldview we no longer regard as true or promising, that
have not been vindicated in any well-confirmed theories, but that nonetheless
tend to influence the way we frame our inquiries. The concept of a nonphysical
soul is illustrative. So far as we can surmise, the neural processes implement
ing human thought and action operate under the principle of causal closure.
Our best evidence for this is the utter lack of experiments in which the best
explanation of observed phenomena requires the postulation of a nonphysical
cause.
Some concepts are dubious by psychological role. These are categories con
trolled by conceptualizing capacities prone to abundant false positives or
false negatives. Consider by analogy visual illusions. Under a range of condi
tions, our visual capacities produce systemic errors. Similarly, under a range
of conditions, our cognitive and affective capacities produce systemic errors.
But there is a crucial disanalogy. Most visual illusions are easily identified
and compensated for, whereas most conceptualizing illusions occur without
the agents notice. Some conceptualizing illusions are so much a part of our
deliberative field that it never occurs to us to be troubled by them—not, at
any rate, until we meet with an ingenious experiment that reveals the sys
temic error.
The much-discussed theory of Daniel Wegner (2002) is a case in point. The
human mind, according to Wegner, comprises a system that generates the
felt experience of consciously willing and thereby consciously controlling our
actions. Not all of our actions, of course, because many of our actions are rela
tively thoughtless—just those we regard as the products of our will. What is
provocative, and what reveals a tendency towards systemic error, is evidence
adduced by Wegner that this system of conscious willing operates independ
ently of the low level, nonconscious mechanisms that actually cause us to act.
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Ihe mechanisms that cause our actions, it appears, are not the mechanisms
that give us certain beliefs and feelings about the causes of our actions. We are
led astray by the very constitution of our psychology.
Wegner s theory, when integrated with theories from distinct areas of
inquiry, wields considerable power. Indeed, Wegner combines experiments
from his lab with evidence (some explicated later) concerning a broad range of
affective and cognitive phenomena. The strength of his theory rests upon the
integrated view of the self that emerges from these diverse phenomena, espe
cially the view of our apparent capacity to control our actions by consciously
willing. It is the breadth of converging evidence that makes it rational to hold
that the concept of conscious willing, because it generates an abundance of
false positives and negatives that are difficult to detect, is dubious by psycho
logical role.
I will explicate Wegner s theory in due course, but I wish to highlight a general
feature of our inclination toward conservatism and imperialism, namely, that we
tend to be most conservative or imperialistic with respect to concepts most dubi
ous. The greater the staying power of a conceptual category, the greater our ten
dency to try to save it, perhaps because we feel confident that long-lived concepts
must be tracking something real and important. Indeed, the mechanisms that
give concepts their staying power are among the very mechanisms that render
some concepts so dubious. Some are preserved by culturally instituted mecha
nisms of transmission; some by the architecture of our psychology (mechanisms
that produce persistent errors we tend not to notice); and some, no doubt, are
preserved both by cultural and psychological factors.' Concepts preserved by
any of these mechanisms are going to recur in our deliberative activities; they
are going to appear important precisely because they are so tenacious.
Thus, we must be especially cautious in the study of the human self because
the concepts with which we understand our capacities as agents are among
the most dubious. Concepts such as "free will" and "moral responsibility" are
clearly dubious by descent, thanks to our largely theological ancestry, and
many of the concepts with which we understand our capacities as agents are
dubious by psychological role, as we are about to see.
CURATIVE DIRECTIVES
If the above line of reasoning is correct, if the need for reform in our methods
is real, we must diminish the retarding effects of our conservatism and impe
rialism regarding dubious concepts. To that end, I propose we adopt directives
for inquiry formulated in light of our best theories of the very mechanisms
that lead us astray. I begin with a directive designed to diminish the ill effects
of concepts dubious by psychological role;
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DP:JFor any concept dubious by psychological role, do not make it a condi
tion of adequacy 011 our theories that we "save" or otherwise preserve that
concept; rather, identify the conditions (if any) under which the concept
is correctly applied and withhold antecedent authority from that concept
under all other conditions.
Withholding antecedent authority from a concept comes to this: we frame
our inquiries without that concept. This is not to adopt eliminativism con
cerning dubious concepts, dhe directive is to withhold dubious concepts from
inquiry until we have reasonable knowledge of the conditions, if any, under
which they can correctly be applied. A further aim is to cultivate intellectual
creativity. The aim is not merely to avoid concepts that demonstrably lead us
astray but also to put ourselves under pressure to create alternative categories
with which to explain and predict the phenomena.5
When our knowledge of the mechanisms involved in the application of a
concept gives rise to such doubts concerning that concept, the directive in DP
is essential. We need a reliable process with which one part of our psychol
ogy can mitigate the ill effects of another part. To illustrate, consider a few
details of our apparent capacity for consciously willing our actions. Wegner's
proposed system is triggered when we consciously perceive instances of the
following pair:
A thought about or the intention to perform action A
&
THE perception or recollection of oneself performing action A

You think about taking another sip of wine and then perceive yourself sip
ping. These conscious inputs trigger an interpretive system in your psychol
ogy, the function of which is to render your actions intelligible. It achieves
this in two steps. It first produces a causal hypothesis to the effect that you,
by virtue of your prior thought or intention, caused yourself to perform the
action. The hypothesis is that your conscious thought is the means by which
you controlled the production of your action. Then the system produces an
accompanying affect, a felt sense of achievement, what Wegner calls the emo
tion of authorship.6 This interpretive system does all this even though your
action was caused by a separate set of mechanisms. This is Wegner's theory of
apparent mental causation.
The power of this theory derives from the breadth of additional theories
with which it integrates. Consider, for instance, the forward model of motor
control.7 Suppose I ask you to perform a simple intentional action. I ask you
to touch the tip of your nose with your right pointer finger. As you move your
right arm, your brain generates a continuous stream of predictions about
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where your arm ought to be at the next instant, relative to the goal of reaching
the tip of your nose, lhat is why it is a "forward" model: the system generates
predictions concerning the ideal future location of your arm. These predic
tions are useful because they are compared to the continuous proprioceptive
feedback regarding the actual position and trajectory of your arm. Any mis
match between predicted and actual position is then used to update the signals
sent to your muscles, thereby correcting your action in real time. All of this
happens with breathtaking speed at a level of processing inaccessible to con
scious awareness.
What is intriguing is that, in the course of executing these anticipatory
functions, your brain suppresses its own ability to fully process incoming sen
sory information. Put generally, the processing of sensory information is sup
pressed or at least attenuated whenever we act intentionally. This appears clear
from experiments reported in Blakemore, Wolpert, and Frith (1999).8 In one
study, experimenters first asked subjects to touch the palm of their right hand
using a device manipulated with their left hand; subjects were asked, that is, to
perform a simple intentional action. They then asked subjects to allow them,
the experimenters, to touch subjects' right hand by manipulating the inter
vening device. The results were striking. When the experimenter initiated the
action—when the act of touching was not intended by the subjects—subjects
rated the sensation in their right palm as intense and tickly. When, however,
subjects initiated the action themselves, they rated the sensation as less intense
and tickly. Our motor control capacities, in the course of executing intended
actions, suppress the processing of incoming sensory information.
The same attenuation occurred in a second study. Subjects once again were
asked to touch the palms of their right hands by manipulating an intervening
device with their left hands. What subjects did not know was that the exper
imenters were introducing very short delays in the operation of the device.
With each trial the motion of the intervening device and the subsequent sen
sory perception were delayed relative to the subjects' initiation of the intended
action. The results were striking. When the delay was short, subjects reported
that the sensation was neither intense nor tickly. The brain, while executing
the intended action, suppressed the processing of sensory input. But as the
delay grew longer, as sensation became increasingly distant from action initia
tion, the sensation of being tickled increased. The sensation was increasingly
processed as coming from something external to the self.9
This attenuation of sensory information is important in two ways. First,
our motor capacities suppress an enormous quantity of sensory information
whenever we act intentionally. One part of our psychology (motor control)
conceals from another part (conscious awareness) a large set of causal infor
mation. And this contributes to what we might call a kind ofphenomenological
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quiet, a degree of subjective silence against which the things that do come to
conscious awareness—including the conscious inputs that trigger Wegner's
interpretive system—appear salient in our conscious, deliberative fields. The
factors that come to conscious awareness, against this backdrop of quiet, are
bound to strike us as causally efficacious, especially when processed by an
interpretive system dedicated to causal intelligibility. Second, the misleading
effects produced by this phenomenological quiet arise from the very archi
tecture of our psychology. This is no small point. Some of Wegner's critics try
to dismiss his view by insisting that he is concerned with oddball illusions or
marginal mistakes that our otherwise veridical capacities do not suffer. But
integrating Wegner's view in this way shows that these critics are mistaken.
We are seduced not at the margins but by capacities at our agential core.
Now consider the theory of naive realism, which also integrates with the
theory of apparent mental causation. The main elements of naive realism
are three: (1) We tend to assume that we see things in an unmediated and
objective manner. (2) We tend to assume that other rational persons will see
things as we do. (3) We tend to dismiss those who disagree as ignorant, sloth
ful, irrational, or biased. The background suggestion is that, because each of
us approaches a situation, especially situations involving other persons, with
limited knowledge and extensive ignorance of what is going on, we must
solve what researchers in Artificial Intelligence call the "frame" problem by
quickly constructing an operable construal of the situation. We do this by
imagining or filling in details that help us decide what is most significant
about the situation we face.10 The origin of our naive realism, then, is that we
construct a construal of the situation in the absence of a much-needed check.
There is no check on the confidence that our construal is correct and, in
consequence, no check on our confidence that our construal will be adopted
by others.
Why this absence? Why are we devoid of a mechanism to remind us that
our construal is gleaned from a particular perspective and that people with
other perspectives will likely construe the situation differently? We do not
know. If, however, our tendency toward naive realism is manifest in social
situations, we might do well to conjoin it with the theory of mind theory."
On this view, our construal of the desires or intentions that motivate the
behavior of other agents may strike us with such force that we are affectively
inclined to trust it as accurate. A tendency to respond in this way may have
provided anticipatory advantages during our evolutionary history; unbridled
confidence in one's construal may have had greater selective value than epistemic caution. Even today, the feeling that one is right in one's assessments
of others may conduce to decisive action, better learning, greater career pros
pects, enhanced interpersonal relations, and increased survival. Arrogance
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concerning ones self may be less costly than accuracy, especially in social
interactions.
lhe crucial upshot is that, in addition to the phenomenological quiet that
accompanies our intentional actions, we naively overestimate the accuracy
of our conscious assessments of the causes of our actions. We are seduced
into thinking and feeling that the causal hypotheses that rise to conscious
awareness are correct. And like the ill effects of phenomenological quiet, our
naive realism results from the constitution of our psychology. The former are
by-products of a central system (motor control), whereas the latter result from
an absence in the architecture of our psychology. Either way, these deficits are
the direct effects of the system's normal operations; mistakes at the margins
are not the issue.
The power of the directive in DP thus derives from the convergence of a
range of theories, including those described here. The theory of apparent men
tal causation is confirmed in part by the extent to which it integrates with the
forward model of motor control, the theory of naive realism, and the theory of
mind theory.12 It thus is rational to conclude that the concept of "consciously
willing" is dubious by psychological role and subject to the directive in DP.
This is important for assessing the relevance of contemporary science to the
view of agency presupposed in the law.

EXPLORATORY DIRECTIVES
The directive in DP is curative; it aims to cure us of conservatism and imperial
ism regarding dubious concepts. But it is limited. It helps us avoid what ought
to be avoided without recommending an alternative strategy. The purpose of
this section is to sketch a few components of an alternative that is progressive
rather than conservative or imperialistic, and that is exploratory in the way
that naturalists of the 19th century were explorers. Among the progressive's
directives are the following:
EH: For any capacity of the self we wish to understand, require that we
frame our inquiry and our theory in terms of what is known concerning
our evolutionary history.
A: For any capacity of the self we wish to understand, assume that, as a
consequence of our evolutionary history, it is endowed with the systemic
function of anticipating objects or events relevant to organismic equilib
rium, to the satisfaction of ecological demands, or to both.
NC: For any conscious capacity of the human mind, expect that we will
understand this capacity only after we discover the nonconscious, lowlevel, anticipatory mechanisms implementing that capacity.
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Although EH and A appear banal, their effect on our inquiries can be sub
stantial, altering the way we conceptualize the very capacities we wish to study.
To illustrate, consider the hypothesis that human intelligence is best con
ceptualized as social intelligence. The hypothesis can be articulated in many
ways, but the basic claim is that many of our affective and cognitive capaci
ties evolved as tools enabling us to engage in myriad social relations. This is
no mere speculation. It is based in part on knowledge concerning extant pri
mate species. We know that, in one form or another, all primates are social
animals,13 capable of identifying con-specifics, recognizing social relations
between con-specifics, recognizing one's own relations with others, respond
ing appropriately to changes in those relations, and so on. And it is easy to
generate hypotheses concerning the anticipatory functions of all these capaci
ties." We also know that Homo sapiens is the most social of primates. There
is, for example, a clear difference in the breadth and depth of our cultural
institutions, evidence that our capacities for social relations run wider and
deeper. More specifically, human children by their fourth year clearly exercise
the capacities posited in the theory of mind theory; 4 years is about the age at
which most children begin to pass the false belief test. In addition, children
as young as 9 months exhibit striking precursor capacities. They follow the
gaze of adults, jointly focus on shared objects, imitate the behavior of others,
and so on.15 And ingenious, recent experiments suggest that human infants
are reading minds, even attributing false beliefs, as early as 2 years of age.16 By
contrast, it is contentious whether other primate species possess the full suite
of capacities posited in the theory of mind theory.17
There is also evidence of our social intelligence from neuroscience. Human
infants attend preferentially to other humans. They attend to human faces
more than any other visual stimuli and to human speech more than any other
auditory stimuli. Infants as young as 2 days exhibit a distinctive cerebral blood
flow when they hear a normal sentence but not when the sentence is played
backward. And so on.18 There is also the intriguing hypothesis that among
the emotional systems implemented in the mammalian brain is what jaak
Panksepp (1998) dubs the PANIC system. This system functions to gener
ate behavioral routines to free the organism from life-threatening situations.
Effects of this system are evident in the distress calls of infants when sepa
rated from their mother, which are accompanied by physiological processes
exhibited when an organism is suffocating, when it cannot catch a breath. This
powerful response to separation is implemented in distinct neural structures
and chemical processes identified by Panksepp. And the very same structures
and processes that constitute the PANIC system also implement the reaction
that adult mammals have to loss. Human grief is implemented in the brain's
PANIC system.
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Panksepp's hypothesis provides a striking account of our social emotions.
If the basic function of the PANIC system is to generate behaviors to free the
organism from threats to its life, a closely related function is to empower the
organism to avoid or alleviate the experience of loss by establishing social
attachments. The hypothesis is that the neural system that causes us to panic
in response to loss is the very system that moves us to seek emotional attach
ments with others. Indeed, the PANIC system comprises neural structures
known to implement certain forms of physical pain, suggesting that separa
tion distress and grief are, literally, a form of pain and that the compulsion
toward social relatedness is an anticipatory strategy for keeping some forms
of pain at bay.19
This brief survey of the social intelligence hypothesis illustrates the power
of EH and A. Notice, in particular, that our initial understanding of a capac
ity is altered by the application of these directives. Wegners interpretive sys
tem, once again, is a case in point. What is the evolved, anticipatory function
of a system that, by hypothesis, causes us to falsely believe that our conscious
intentions cause our actions? Wegner (2007) offers several speculations, each
keyed to an anticipatory, social function, and when we conceptualize our
capacity for conscious willing in this way, as dedicated to some social func
tion, our understanding is indeed altered. Instead of conceptualizing the feel
ing of conscious willing as evidence of a remarkable form of freedom, we
conceptualize it in terms of our evolutionary history and the ways in which
it prepares us for what is likely to occur next. We see the capacity as, for
example, a mechanism that inclines us to inform one another about actions
we are likely to perform, or a mechanism that causes us to feel a sense of
obligation toward one another, and so on. And because there appears to be
nothing parochial about conscious willing in this regard, the point here can
be generalized: we should expect that, as our knowledge of the self progresses,
our understanding of the phenomena we are trying to explain will shift in
significant ways.
This shift also illustrates the power of the directive in NC. The feeling of
willing, for instance, occurs at the level of conscious awareness; we are introspectively aware of some features of the process. And we tend to feel confident
that the way things appear to us concerning the causes of our actions is an
accurate reflection of the actual causes. Our confidence, however, is misplaced.
Once we ask about the anticipatory function of any conscious capacity, we will
likely discover mechanisms operating below conscious awareness that force us
to revise our initial understanding. In general, it is rational to expect that our
capacities for conscious experience will not be adequately understood until we
discover the evolved, anticipatory functions of nonconscious mechanisms that
implement those capacities.
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If these exploratory directives are defensible, we must do more than with
hold antecedent authority from dubious concepts. We must also fill the gaps
in our conceptual repertoire left by the application of DP. We may begin by
framing our inquiries with relevant knowledge from evolutionary biology and
searching for the anticipatory functions of mechanisms that operate beyond
the reach of conscious awareness. These are strategies informed by our best
sciences of the self. And when we apply these strategies, we begin to appreciate
how little of our capacities as agents we presently understand.

SKEPTICISM CONCERNING HUMAN AGENCY
If, then, the concept "conscious willing" is dubious by psychological role, and if
the exploratory directives reveal that our former understanding of "conscious
willing" is best replaced by a more informed understanding of the relevant
capacity, then it is no longer rational to frame our inquiries in terms of this
concept. It is no longer rational to assume that our alleged capacity for con
scious willing is what we formerly took it to be. In particular, we cannot take it
as given that our apparent capacity to consciously will our own actions reflects
an actual capacity to control our actions. This is the basis for my skepticism
concerning human agency.
The skeptical thesis is best formulated as an epistemic defeater: for any
action we perform, we cannot justifiably claim to know from the first-person
point of view the actual causes of our action. The claim is not that we never
have true beliefs about the causes of our actions, but rather that we cannot reli
ably discriminate from the first-person point of view between cases in which
our beliefs about our actions are true and cases in which they are false. This
defeats the possibility of justifying, at least from the first-person perspective,
beliefs about the causes of our actions. That is the lesson on which the theories
described above appear to converge.
Still, this defeater appears to conflict with any number of ordinary cases in
which we intuitively take ourselves to know the causes of our actions. Suppose
it is Monday afternoon and you see me walking across the parking lot and
entering my daughter's school. You ask me what I am doing. I tell you I am
picking up Cassie and taking her to her piano lesson. Being nosy, or perhaps
being an inquisitive social psychologist, you ask me why I am doing this. Being
a congenial philosopher, I tell you that several weeks ago my wife and I agreed
on a weekly schedule. 1 am taking Cassie to her lesson because that is what I
agreed to do.20
Such intuitions, especially about cases in which the relevant action has been
planned in advance, may appear to challenge the epistemic defeater.21 But in
fact they do not. In responding to your question, it is plausible to suppose that

126

NEUROSCIENCE AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

my episodic memory quickly recollects a relevant event. It retrieves an agree
ment I made several weeks ago, the content of which is that every Monday
afternoon during the semester I will take Cassie to her lesson. My memory did
this, presumably, because the social situation demanded a timely response to
your question. But the mere fact that my memory retrieved this recollection
does not entail or even suggest that the content of this recollection is the actual
cause of my action. My episodic memory, in recalling my earlier agreement,
appears nicely attuned to considerations of relevance, but relevance requires
nothing stronger than association.
Moreover, the actual causes of my action, whatever they might be, are factors
that caused me to leave the house and drive to Cassie's school, and for all I can
tell from the first-person point of view, the agreement I made weeks ago is caus
ally unrelated to those factors. Of course, it certainly feels to me that the content
of my recollection is causally related, but the reliability of this feeling is under
mined by the theories surveyed above.221 also grant that I may truly believe that
my recollection is causally relevant, but true belief does not suffice for justifica
tion. Hie theories surveyed above show that, from the first-person perspective,
we cannot reliably discriminate cases in which our prior thoughts cause our
actions from cases in which they do not. That is the basis of my defeater.
We might vary the locus of the objection. Instead of fixing on my present
recollection of an agreement made several weeks ago, fix on the conscious
thoughts that occurred just before the action. Suppose I was engrossed in
work all afternoon until I happened to glance at my watch. "Oh," I exclaimed,
"time to collect Cassie's music and get to her school!" Suppose I even exhorted
myself: "I cannot renege on my agreement with Ann!" Suppose, finally, that
upon reaching the school and hearing your question, I consciously recall and
report to you the exclamations and exhortation that occurred just before initi
ating my action. Does this show that I know the actual causes of my action?
Not at all. It is true that my agreement with my wife was recalled to con
scious awareness just before I began my Monday afternoon routine. But, again,
it does not follow that this recollection is part of the actual causes of the action.
All manner of nonconscious processes were no doubt occurring in me as I
realized it was time to stop working, and I have conscious access to virtually
none of them. And we know from the theories of Wegner and Wolpert and
Blakemore and others that the things which do rise to conscious awareness
often seduce us toward causal beliefs that are demonstrably false. That, to
repeat, is the upshot of the theories canvased above: we know that in many
cases the correlations we observe among our conscious perceptions or rec
ollections concerning our actions are unreliable indicators of genuine causal
connections, and nothing available from the first-person perspective enables
us to discriminate the causes from mere correlations.
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In general, it makes no difference where in the sequence we frx our atten
tion. Even when the relevant action was planned weeks in advance, the actor
is faced with an open question concerning the actual causes that finally move
him to act. This is the basis of my skepticism. To refute it, we need an alterna
tive theory of the self based upon a convergence of evidence of equal or greater
strength. Short of that, no matter how unintuitive or unsettling it may be,
skepticism is the rational position to adopt.
There is, moreover, an analogue to the above defeater that applies from
the third-person perspective. When we claim that some other agent acted
voluntarily, we posit a causal process that includes what we traditionally
describe as "conscious willing." Yet, as we have seen, because the concept
"conscious willing" is dubious by psychological role, it ought to be factored
out of our inquiries and replaced by considerations from our evolutionary and
social history. If that is right, then we cannot justifiably frame our inquiries
in terms of a concept so deeply dubious. Precisely that is the basis for an
additional defeater: for any action performed by another agent, we cannot
justifiably claim to know that the agent acted voluntarily by consciously willing
it. It must be emphasized that this defeater rests upon the above directives.
The curative directive directs us to withhold antecedent authority, and the
exploratory directives direct us to conceptualize the relevant capacity in terms
of our history. The reason, therefore, that we cannot justifiably claim to know
whether another person consciously willed her action is that, in light of our
best sciences of the self, the central conceptual category has no legitimate role
in contemporary inquiry.
You might worry that my skepticism refutes itself by rendering impossible
all forms of rational debate. If we are indeed faced with my defeaters concern
ing our reasons for acting, and if adducing evidential or logical relations for a
scientific or philosophical thesis qualifies as an action, it appears we can never
know the reasons why anyone ever accepts one theory over another, which
would undermine the very possibility of rational debate. It would seem to
show, in particular, that I cannot give any reasons for skepticism concerning
human agency."
This worry is motivated by the apparent phenomenology of actual
intellectual discussions. When in conversation you challenge some part of
my view, I focus my attention on specific features of the world. When, for
instance, you ask me why I hold a given thesis, I appeal to features of the
world I judge to be evidentially potent. What seems crucial is that the features
to which I appeal are consciously accessible to me. How could it be otherwise?
How could I appeal in conversation to considerations that do not come to
conscious awareness? The worry, then, is that my defeaters conflict with this
bit of phenomenology. My first defeater seems to entail that I cannot justifiably
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claim to know my reasons for defending the relevant thesis, which seems
to preclude the possibility of my rationally defending my view. My second
defeater seems to entail that you cannot justifiably claim to know my reasons
lor defending the thesis, which appears to make reasoned exchange between
us utterly impossible.
'here are several reasons why this objection is wide of the mark. I will
mention just two. First, the phenomenology of our rational discussions
is concerned with a relatively narrow notion of "reasons." My reasons for
accepting a given thesis are patterns of evidential relations between facts
in the world and the contents of the thesis, or logical relations between the
thesis and other theses. As such, these sorts of reasons are limited. Even
if they reveal substantive relations between the thesis and certain facts or
certain other theses, they fail to explain why I endorse the thesis. It is naive
to assume that I endorse any thesis simply because of the substantive rela
tions it bears to certain facts or to other theses. This is not to confess a foible
or infirmity unique to myself. It is true of any intelligent organism whose
capacities for acting are a mix of cognitive and affective capacities that oper
ate mostly beyond the reach of conscious awareness. The evidential or logical
relations I consciously acknowledge as my reasons are surely supplemented
and in some instances supplanted by a host of nonconscious processes. That,
at any rate, is the upshot of the scientific theories surveyed above. And that
means there is a much fatter notion of "reasons" relevant to all forms of
human action. This fatter notion is surely applicable to the actions we per
form in the course of intellectual debates, but it is even more pertinent to
actions that fall under concepts of legal responsibility. Indeed, this relatively
fat notion of "reasons" is at the heart of the concept of criminal responsibil
ity described in section I.
My second response is that it is false that my view rules out the possibil
ity of knowing our reasons for acting. It rules out the possibility of knowing
our reasons in certain ways, including ways assumed by many philosophers,
legal theorists, and laypersons, but it is compatible with knowledge acquired
in other ways. So long as my first defeater stands, we cannot justifiably claim
to know our reasons from a first-person point of view, but that leaves open the
possibility of subjecting our agential capacities, including our reason-giving
capacities, to scientific investigation. My second defeater, moreover, suggests
we cannot justifiably claim to know that another agent acted voluntarily by
virtue of conscious willing. But that is compatible with the scientific study of
our capacities as agents in terms of conceptual categories other than "conscious
willing" and "voluntariness." Whether we can at present articulate an alterna
tive concept is not to the point. It would be the most egregious form of con
ceptual imperialism to insist that we must preserve our traditional concepts of
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agency just because we have yet to formulate other concepts informed by what
is actually known about the human self,24

"VOLUNTARINESS" AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
I come at last to the troubling implications that my defeaters raise for "legal
responsibility." In the Model Penal Code, a notion of criminal responsi
bility is explicated in part by appeal to "voluntariness," though the expli
cation given, as we saw in section I, is remarkably uninformative. This is
so, I surmise, on the assumption that there exists sufficient shared cultural
knowledge to fill the gaps in any given case. The crucial assumption, then,
is that most citizens know that we are agents who sometimes determine
their actions and also know when, under what conditions, our actions result
from such determinations. And this crucial assumption is precisely where
we meet the troubling implications of my skepticism, for this assumption
is indeed false.
It should be clear by now that we do not possess shared cultural knowledge
concerning the nature of human agency because we are burdened with the
previously described epistemic defeaters. Thanks to progress in knowledge, we
cannot justifiably claim to know from the first-person perspective the causes
of our actions. Nor can we justifiably claim to know of some other person
that he "determined" his own action because the central concept is so clearly
dubious and our most fruitful methods direct us to conceptualize the relevant
capacity in very different terms. In general, recent progress in the scientific
study of the human self reveals that we do not know what kinds of agent we
are. The characterization of criminal responsibility given in the Model Penal
Code cannot serve its intended function.
Of course, the assumption that there exists shared knowledge of our capac
ities as agents runs deep and wide in our culture. That I do not deny. But the
persistence and power of that assumption can be explained without grant
ing its truth. It can be explained, in particular, by the persistence and power
of concepts dubious by descent and by psychological role, and by our stub
born inclination toward conceptual conservatism and imperialism. It may be
possible, moreover, to alter or eliminate this widespread assumption. If the
expectations and intuitions of informed citizens are brought up to speed, if
they come to reflect the larger implications of our best sciences, then appeals
to commonsense may become increasingly impotent, even pathetic, when
opposed to the findings of contemporary science, and our traditional con
cepts of the self may be revised or replaced. Until then, however, we remain
burdened with laws that, for wont of knowledge of ourselves, cannot fulfill
their functions.
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These skeptical doubts concerning human agency are grave in two
ways. They are grave because they are derived from demanding methods
of inquiry. The argumentative strategy of Darwin's Origin is illustrative. Its
power stems from the convergence upon a single view of life from a broad
range of distinct phenomena concerning living things. The same holds for
understanding core capacities of living things, including our capacities to
deliberate, choose, and act. There is a growing convergence on the nature of
the self across the relevant sciences. Not a fully articulated view of the self,
to be sure, but enough to articulate some important claims: (1) A great deal
of our mental lives is lived beneath the level of conscious awareness. (2) At
least some of the phenomena comprising conscious awareness are partial,
misleading, or illusory. (3) As a consequence, we are in a muddle about our
capacities as agents; we know enough to appreciate how little we understand
our experiences as selves. That is one reason why the doubts are grave: they
emerge from a breadth and depth of current scientific knowledge that cannot
rationally be ignored.
The doubts appear grave in another way, in terms of vital practical mat
ters. The most pressing question is whether these doubts concerning human
agency will take hold in the larger culture and, if they do, what effects they
will likely provoke. One problematic effect will be the lack of a clear alter
native. We live in a period of profound uncertainty about the nature of our
selves; we have no choice but to endure a great deal of confusion. Another
problem is knowing when to trust the converging results of human inquiry.
How integrated and mature must a set of scientific theories be for us ration
ally to use it as the basis for policies that affect social stability, fairness, and
human well-being? This is a deeply vexing question, especially for organisms
who need to anticipate and feel a sense of control. Finally, there is the ques
tion of whether we have the stomach for periods of conceptual confusion, for
not knowing how to think or feel ourselves as agents, and whether we will
respond with creativity to better conform our beliefs and practices to the way
the world actually is, or whether we will panic and revert to conservatism and
imperialism.25
NOTES
1. We tend to attribute guilt tor what a person actually does, not for what a person
merely thinks. Hence the focus here on bodily movement.
2. On this point, see chapters 6 and 7 of this text.
3. The discussion in this and the next two sections is a highly compressed version
of portions of my recent book (Davies 2009). Compression of course tends to
distort. I hope, however, there is intelligibility enough to recommend the fuller
discussion in the book.
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4. Cultural mechanisms of conceptual stasis are discussed in Norris and Inglehart
2004, Richerson and Boyd 2005, chapter 6 of Davies 2009, and elsewhere. Evidence
for the efficacy of psychological mechanisms of stasis is described throughout this
essay and in Davies 2009.
5. In Davies 2009, part 2,1 defend an additional directive to diminish the ill effects
of concepts dubious by descent.
6. Since "sense" and "emotion" hardly appear equivalent, you might worry that I am
being conceptually flat-footed. Perhaps so. But conceptual fussiness is a virtue
only when it makes a difference in substance. Wegner is interested in not one
specific affective response but rather a whole cluster. He is interested in the full
range of responses to our own actions that tempt us to feel that we are conscious
controllers of those actions.
7. See Wolpert at al 1995. Wolpert 1997 is an accessible overview.
8. See also Blakemore, Frith, and Wolpert 2000.
9. Choudhury and Blakemore 2006 provide a recent overview.
10. For experimental evidence, see Ross and Ward 1996, Pronin et al. 2002, Pronin
et a!. 2004, and Pronin 2007. This last paper surveys recent studies of the biasing
effects of naive realism.
11. Tomasello 1999 and Leslie 2000 are good overviews.
12. The full integrative picture is much broader than I can depict here. Also relevant
is John Bargh's work on automaticity (e.g., Bargh et al. 2001; Dijksterhuis and
Bargh 2001), Timothy Wilson's on knowing our reasons for acting (e.g., Nisbett
and Wilson 1977a and 1977b; Wilson 2002), Martin Conway's on autobiographi
cal memory (e.g., Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000; Conway 2003), and so on.
13. See Smuts et al. 1987 for the remarkable range of social structures among primate
species.
14. Indeed, the challenge is generating experimental evidence with which to
discriminate among all the possible hypotheses.
15. Tomasello 1995 and 1999.
16. Baillargeon et al. 2010.
17. Tomasello and Call 1997.
18. These references come from Cheney and Seyfarth's marvelous 2007 book on
social intelligence in baboons and humans (p. 6). Cheney and Seyfarth cite
Dehaene-Lambertz et al. 2002 and Pena et al. 2003.
19. See chapter 14 of Panksepp 1998. The implications of this view for the so-called
"reactive attitudes" are considerable. Or so I think. See chapter 9 of Davies
2009.
20. This oversimplifies, of course. There are several reasons why i take Cassie to her
lessons, including the pleasure of being with her.
21. I am grateful to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for raising this challenge.
22. The reliability of this feeling may vary with certain features of the action and
the situation in which it occurs. This appears to be an implication of the theory
defended in Wilson 2002. When action and context are relatively simple and
unambiguous, reliability may be greater; the interpretive system that helps us
make sense of our actions may be less prone to error in uncluttered contexts.
(I discuss this point in Davies 2009:146ff.) This is not, however, a difference we
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can read off our feelings at the time, and it leaves ample room for error in the
complex and ambiguous real-life cases in which knowledge of our reasons mat
ters most.
23. 1 am grateful to Nicole Vincent tor pressing this worry.
24. Ihese two replies merely sketch the direction that a fuller response would
likely take.
25. This essay descends from a presentation given at Delft Technical University
in August 2009 on the occasion of an interdisciplinary conference, Moral
Responsibility: Neuroscience, Organization, and Engineering, organized by Neelke
Doom, Jessica Nihlen Fahlquist, and Nicole Vincent. I am grateful to the organ
izers tor a setting in which scholars from a wide range of fields engaged construc
tively. My travels to the Netherlands were supported by the Wendy and Emery
Reves Center lor International Studies at the College of William and Mary and by
Silvia Tandeciaraz, Dean of Educational Policy at the College. I am grateful for
both sources ot support. I also received help from several good thinkers. Thanks
to Stephen Morse and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for much-needed advice; to
Walter, George Harris, and Nicole Vincent for probing comments on an earlier
draft; to an anonymous referee tor OUP Press for constructive resistance; and to
Nicole for thoughtful advice throughout.
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